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Abstract
This article explores the relationship between Chinese officials and Western
European industrialists, revealing that in the second half of the 1950s, there
already was a specific Western European interest in China’s market potential,
and that this wasmet with favour on theChinese side. In order to become a strong
and independent country, thePeople’sRepublic ofChinawas especially interested
in evaluating a wide range of offers in the chemical and energy sectors. By looking
at the early achievements of the Italian company, National Hydrocarbon Holding
(Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi, ENI), this article will show how its offer in terms of
technology and engineering met with the favour of the Chinese at the beginning
of the 1960s. This was just when the local petroleum industry wasmoving towards
self-reliance, which China ultimately achieved, albeit for a short time. Sources
show that, despite economic and political constraints, PRC decision-makers were
perfectly aware of prices and commercial strategies, as well as of the state-of-
the-art technology of the time. Furthermore, China’s commercial cooperation
with Western European companies in the 1950s–1960s meant that early on
Chinese leaders had an opportunity to evaluate market alternatives to their
tightly constraining alliance with the Socialist bloc.
∗ The research for this article was initially financed by Ca’ Foscari University of
Venice and has proceeded thanks to a generous grant from the European Union 7th
Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013). I wish to thank all colleagues who offered
their valuable comments on earlier versions of this article. In particular, I am grateful
to Odd Arne Westad, Anna Soulsby, Jari Elorantaa, and one anonymous reviewer of
this journal.
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Introduction
When the People’s Republic was established in October 1949, the
new leadership knew they had a painstaking task ahead of them.
After so many years of war, the population was in a critical condition
and China’s manufacturing industry and agricultural sector had
reached their lowest peak. The world was heading decidedly towards
ever-greater division, which would limit the choice in military and
economic alliances. Mao Zedong decided to make a radical change by
steering the Chinese economy towards heavy industry to equip the
country with a solid base in case of foreign aggression.1 With the
signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual
Assistance in 1950, China started a huge programme of industrial
and technological exchange with the Soviet Union. The partnership
led to the conclusion of 156major projects. Out of the first 50 projects
realized before 1953 in the most urgent sectors—coal, electricity,
steel and iron, non-ferrous metal, the chemical and engineering
industries, and the military—44.7 per cent were in the energy
sector.2
The First Five-Year Plan (1953–1958) resulted in a good
economic performance for the country and proved highly beneficial
for the population at large.3 However, it is difficult to trace a
straight line forwards. In 1955 criticisms of the slow pace of
transformation led to the speeding up of land collectivization
and nationalization of company ownership. Mao’s firm belief in
accelerated growth would eventually lead to the Great Leap
Forward.
The push for research in oil extraction and refinery was an integral
part of Mao’s vision of a strong and independent China. New
explorations had already started in the early 1950s and reached a
first peak in 1958. In the early 1960s, alongside the new autarkic
line deriving from China’s attempts to distance itself from the Soviet
Union, the search for independence in energy sources found its
1 China’s incorporation into the system of command economies, based on the Soviet
model, started at several levels in the earlymonths of 1949. Kirby,W. (2006). ‘China’s
Internationalization in the Early People’s Republic: Dreams of a Socialist World
Economy’, The China Quarterly, Vol. 188, pp. 870–890.
2 Shen, Zhihua and Xia, Yafeng (2015). Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, 1945–
1959. A New History, Lexington Books, Lanham, pp. 88–91.
3 Naughton, B. (2006). The Chinese Economy. Transitions and Growth, MIT Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
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expression in the ideology of ‘self-reliance’.4 China reduced its oil
imports, eventually becoming an oil producer in 1963.5 Though never
able to produce a wide range of products, Chinamaintained this status
for slightly more than a decade. Any desire for energy self-sufficiency
was abandoned after 1978, as the huge economic development process
started by Deng Xiaoping meant that the country needed to rely on
imports to support this major effort.6
As noted by several economists, the single most important statistic
around China’s planned economy is that 50 per cent of the machinery
and equipment required for the First Five-Year Plan had to be
imported.7 Reflecting Mao’s famous statement about the need for
China to ‘lean on one side’, most came from the Soviet Union and
Socialist bloc countries. From 1952 to 1953 China’s trade with the
Socialist bloc expanded by 25 per cent. During the Korean War,
China’s trade with the West plummeted due to American- and UN-
imposed embargoes. However, as soon as the war ended, China’s trade
with non-Socialist Europe grew much faster than its trade with the
Socialist bloc: between 1953 and 1958 imports from the former more
than quadrupled.8 In real figures, numbers are relatively small: at
its peak, trade turnover (exports plus imports) was US$4.3 billion
in 1959. China’s international trade was not large in comparison
to its national income.9 However, it is important to analyse the
nature of the imports, which comprised fertilizers, capital goods, and
foodstuff. Until 1960, capital goods formed the biggest portion of
China’s imports (65 per cent of the total in 1959), thus confirming the
importance of the investment programme for industrialization. China
exports were agricultural products and textiles. When we consider
that China’s biggest textile output (cotton and silk) was of agricultural
4 One of the few books about this topic is: Lim, Tai-Wei (2008). China’s Quest for
Self-reliance in Oil: The Story of Fushun, Yumen, and Daqing, EdwinMellen Press, Lewiston,
New York.
5 Wen, Houwen et al. (2002). Bainian shiyou [100 Years of Petroleum] 1878–2000,
Dangdai Zhongguo Chubanshe, Beijing, p. 156.
6 It is interesting to note that in the early 1970s China even started to export oil
products on a small scale. See: Chow Chuen-ho, L. (1992). ‘The Changing Role of Oil
in Chinese Exports, 1974–89’, The China Quarterly, Vol. 131, pp. 750–756.
7 Bramall makes this point, quoting Eckstein, A. (1966). Communist China’s Economic
Growth and Foreign Trade, McGraw-Hill, London, p. 137. See: Bramall, C. (2009).
Chinese Economic Development, Routledge, London, p. 100.
8 Eckstein, Communist China’s Economic Growth, pp. 218–219.
9 The ratio of imports to the gross national product was about 4 per cent. The
ratio varies according to the exchange used when making the calculation. Eckstein,
Communist China’s Economic Growth, pp. 120–122.
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X16000275
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. KU Leuven Libraries, on 25 Oct 2017 at 15:23:15, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
136 VALERIA ZANIER
origin, the importance of agriculture increases. Throughout the Mao
years, China’s basic trade pattern was exporting agricultural-based
products in return for capital goods.
In order to understand how international commerce operations were
actually handled by Socialist China, we need to remember that in
Socialist economies foreign trade is a state function.10 It is, therefore,
intimately connected with foreign affairs, representing a true ‘arm of
the state’. However, foreign trade is not situated at the centre of a
Socialist economic system, rather at its periphery. Responsibility for
the full employment of the population is at the core of a Socialist
economic system. All foreign trade operations are subordinated to
the fulfilment of this imperative, and are overseen by state import–
export corporations. The dynamics of exports are determined only
after the country has stated what needs to be imported, and this
often leads to the coexistence of import hunger and export aversion.11
Such stringent state controls result in an excess of structures and in
a situation where there is far more bargaining within the Socialist
bureaucracy than there would be with the foreign buyer, seller,
or bank. According to Kornai, the complication and lengthiness of
decision-making exacerbates the inflexibility of trading and credit
activity, causing foreign trade to be the sector in which the largest
number of hierarchical organizations accumulate, most of the time
overlapping, and thus creating slowness and lack of coordination
exactly where speed and accuracy are supposed to play such a decisive
role.12
The heavy legacy of semi-colonial economic exploitation meant that
the PRC’s system of foreign trade was very much linked to projecting
a new image of the country to the world. The Moscow International
Economic Conference of 1952 and the Geneva Conference of
Indochina of 1954 not only represented important moments for the
construction of Socialist China’s system of diplomatic relations, but
also corresponded to milestones in the development of a new way
of dealing with foreign economic relations. The Moscow Conference
hosted delegations from 49 countries, offering business people the
first opportunity to interact directly with the PRC’s main import–
10 Holzman, F. D. (1976). International Trade under Communism: Politics and Economics,
Basic Books, New York.
11 Kornai, J. (1992). The Socialist System. The Political Economy of Communism,
Clarendon Press, Oxford.
12 Ibid.
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export corporations; contracts were signed with companies from
Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, West Germany, the Netherlands,
Switzerland, and Finland.13 It also represented a first step for
Western-based, pro-Socialist organizations to find customers and
manage commercial negotiations. In Geneva, trade-related issues
were discussed between Chinese authorities and more structured
Western business delegations.14
In 1952 the PRC Ministry of Foreign Trade was founded. The
same year saw the creation of the China Council for the Promotion
of International Trade (hereafter the China Council), modelled on
a similar Soviet organization. Its function can be described as pre-
eminently one of ‘liaison’, not officially under government control and
not authorized to handle business operations. Its main role during the
Cold War was to manage the PRC’s economic relations with countries
outside the Socialist bloc. Both the Ministry of Foreign Trade and
the China Council coordinated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and used the network of trade offices established by PRC embassies
abroad. The PRC embassy in Bern worked as the gateway for those
European countries that had not yet opened official relations with
China.
Actual business negotiations were handled by state-owned
monopolistic corporations, organized by sector of activity. They acted
as real commercial agents, usually receiving between 2 and 3 per cent
from the Ministries for each operation performed.15 Among them,
the most relevant for this study are the China National Import–
Export Corporation and China National Technical Import–Export
Corporation. Until the mid-1950s, the former played a coordinating
role for all China’s import operations; later these were distributed
13 Apre oggi i suoi lavori a Mosca la Conferenza economica internazionale, in l’Unità, 3 Aprile
1952. On the Moscow Conference see: Robin, T. (2007). ‘Les relations commerciales
de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne avec la République populaire de Chine, à la
lumière de la Conférence économique internationale de Moscou d’avril 1952’, Revue
d’Histoire Diplomatique, no. 1, pp. 55–72.
14 Zhai, Qiang (1992). ‘China and the Geneva Conference of 1954’, The China
Quarterly, Vol. 129, pp. 103–122.
15 The analysis of China’s economic institutions under Mao is based on the
following sources: Central Archives of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (eds)
(1991). Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingji dang’an ziliao xuanbian (duiwaimaoyi zhuan)
[CollectedPRCEconomicArchiveMaterials (ForeignTrade)], Shehui kexuewenxuan
chubanshe, Beijing, andDonnithorne, A. (1967).China’s Economic System, George Allen
and Unwin, London.
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among the various sectorial corporations.16 Soon after the Moscow
Economic Conference of 1952, the China National Import–Export
Corporation opened an office in East Berlin, which greatly facilitated
contacts with European business people, especially with those whose
governments had not yet established official relations with China.
Those countries that had recognized the PRC in the early 1950s, such
as Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark, as well as neutral countries
such as Switzerland, Sweden,Norway andFinland, had their owndirect
channels.
Starting in 1957, China offered an interesting opportunity to ‘peek
at the Chinese market’ by holding the first International Canton
Fair which was held in the southern city of Guangzhou twice a year
(spring and autumn) and hosted delegations from all over the world.
As it operated with few restrictions regarding the country of origin
of businessmen, the Canton Fair represented China’s most important
window on the world under Mao.17
Among the Western European companies interested in China in
the 1950s and 1960s, some had already started doing business with
China in the early decades of the twentieth century, for example, the
German company BASF, British ICI, and ItalianMontecatini. None of
them, however, hadmaintained their strongholds after the foundation
of the People’s Republic in 1949, after the new government decided
to enact a policy of nationalization. As a result, during the first half of
the 1950s most foreign companies had to close down and move out of
China. Other companies were new to themarket, including the Italian
National Hydrocarbon Holding (ENI), which forms our case study. As
this article will show, a micro-analysis approach of Western sources
can be much more revealing than might be expected.
Whereas the activities carried out byWestern industrialists inChina
were documented, it is very difficult to match this evidence with
Chinese original sources. Archival material related to the post-1949
economy and foreign trade is considered ‘sensitive’, as are documents
16 Instituto nazionale per la storia del movimento di liberazione in Italia (INSMLI),
FondoDinoGentili, Letter Comet Beijing to Comet Rome, 22March 1955. According
to information gathered by Spartaco Muratori in Beijing, the China National Import–
Export Corporation ended its coordinating role in early 1955. Nevertheless, the
company maintained its offices in East Berlin in order to facilitate contacts with
Western Europe.
17 Hongse (jituan) youxian gongsi Hongse huarun bianweihui [China Resources
(Group) Ltd. Editorial Committee] (2010). Hongse huarun [The Story of ‘Red’ China
Resources], Beijing, p. 260.
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related to foreign relations. There is little availability of materials
on foreign trade under Mao, apart from the space dedicated to it in
the few books addressing the Chinese planned economy.18 It would be
desirable in future research to carry out more in-depth studies at the
micro-level, here including the Chinese cadres who handled foreign
trade operations. Many of them were active in the Guomindang era
and had an operational knowledge of the capitalist system. Ji Chaoding
(Chi Chao T’ing), vice-chairman and secretary general of the China
Council, was an eminent economist and lived extensively in theUnited
States. Lesser known characters, such as ChenMing orXieQizhu, had
first-hand experience in international trade and finance, and added a
business-oriented flair to Socialist China’s operations in the 1950s and
1960s.19
This article intends to assess the role played by business relations
in the development of Cold War dynamics among states in opposite
ideological camps. By making consistent use of materials from ENI’s
historical archive, it will analyse a little-known period in the company’s
history: the first decade of ENI’s China operations: 1956–1965.20 In so
doing, the article sets out to evaluate the business strategy devised by
ENImanagers and to assessENI’s role in themaking of an independent
Italian diplomacy towards China. In a setting so highly motivated by
ideology, how ‘pure’ could business relations be? Could ENI’s business
with a Socialist country be profitable? How favourable were the effects
of such exchanges on the Chinese economy?
Moreover, the article will assess the reasons that led a company
owned by an American ally to pursue years of business negotiations
with Mao’s China, when this could evidently be deemed provocative
by Italy’s main ally. Was there a mere business interest behind
ENI’s decision to negotiate with Mao’s China? Or were political
considerations involved?
The article aims to add to the general understanding of
China’s attitude to foreign powers during the first two decades
after the founding of the PRC. An analysis of operations and
18 Donnithorne, China’s Economic System.
19 Chen and Xie played a vital role in providing grain imports from the West in the
early 1960s. See: Mitcham, C. J. (2005). China’s Economic Relations with the West and
Japan, 1949–79. Grain, Trade and Diplomacy, Routledge, London.
20 I would like to take this opportunity to thank Lucia Nardi, the managing director
of the ENI Historical Archives, who welcomed my project and facilitated my research.
Special thanks are due to Anna Landolfi, Daniela Scamuzzi, and all the personnel
working in Pomezia for the kind and professional help they provided during my visits.
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strategies in the chemical and petrochemical industries is revealing
of the rationales behind the decisions of China’s leaders in
industrial policy as well as of their attitude to foreign companies.
Was there specific coordination with foreign trade and technical
cooperation? Did ENI make any contribution to China’s achievement
of self-reliance in petroleum production, so actively sought-after
under Mao?
Finally, the article will channel attention to a period in China’s
economic history that has been long overlooked. The literature
has focused on China’s reform and opening-up, but the country’s
miraculous growth post-1978 remains difficult to explain without
looking at an earlier phase of its development.21
Western European industrialists in Mao’s China: out of the
door, back through the window
The bipolar paradigm saw the American capitalist system juxtaposed
with the Soviet Union Socialist system. Two informal committees—
the Coordinating Committee (alternatively called Cocom or the
Paris Committee, created in 1947) and the Chincom (or China
Differential), created in 1952—composed of representatives from
Japan and all 15 NATO members actively enforced commercial
restrictions to strategic tradingwith the SovietUnion, EasternEurope,
and China.22 In accommodating the Americans’ harsh attitude
towards Socialist China, the Chincom list contained a larger number
21 Many books on China’s economic growth agree that the years of the Socialist
planned economy brought a generalized improvement. However, little analysis is
offered of the integration of pre-1978 elements in post-1978China. Some exceptions
are in: Justin, Yifu Lin (1996). China’s Economic Miracle: Development Strategy and
Economic Reform, The Chinese University of Hong Kong University Press, Hong Kong;
Naughton, The Chinese Economy; Lardy, N. (1994). China in the World Economy, Institute
for International Economics, Washington DC.
22 As pointed out in the first study dedicated to this subject, in many cases the
strategic nature of these committees was liable to doubt and was indeed often
contested. Adler-Karlsson, G. (1968).Western Economic Warfare. A Case Study in Foreign
Economic Policy, Almqvist and Wiksell, Stockholm. On Cocom and Chincom, see
also: Cui, Pi (2000). Meiguo de lengzhan zhanlve he Bali tongchou weiyuanhui, Zhongguo
weiyuanhui 1945–1994 [US Cold War Strategy, Cocom and Chincom], Dongbei Shifan
Daxue Chubanshe, Changchun; 2nd ed.: Zhonghua Shuju, Beijing, 2005; Zhang,
Shuguang (1999). Economic Cold War: America’s Embargo Against China and the Sino-Soviet
Alliance, 1949–1963, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, DC.
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of goods.23 Many of themwere items thatChina’s fast industrialization
was in need of and was keen to import.
This strategy of economic containment devised by the United States
shaped the contours of the East–West confrontation. Nevertheless, the
allies did not fully agree nor comply with the imposed restrictions.24
Recent research has pointed out that business and technological
exchanges were very frequent and relevant to the development of
both Eastern and Western Europe during the Cold War and that ‘the
highest level of political decision making was not the only motor of
change’.25 Whatwenowknow suggests that, similarly, the IronCurtain
that was in place between China and the Free World was more porous
than previously believed. Economists and political analysts of the time
were well aware of NATO countries’ increasing share in the China
trade in the mid-1950s.26 Significantly, in 1957–58 the volume of
China’s trade with the Soviet Union dropped for the first time since
the PRC was established.27
23 In May 1957, the British Board of Trade spoke of 207 items on the embargo list
for China but not controlled for the Soviet bloc: among these were ‘some machine
tools, electric motors and generators, rubber working machinery, most motor vehicles
and tractors, most railway locomotives, rolling stock and other railroad equipment,
most internal combustion engines, some scientific instruments, rubber andmost tires,
and various chemicals’. Such itemsmatchedmost of themain interests that European
companies had with China before the war and some of the new interests whichChina’s
fast industrialization seemed ready to import. Cf. ‘Easing of Controls onChinaTrade’,
The Times , 31May 1957.
24 The contributions of Dobson, Cain, Førland, and Jackson have shown a more
multi-faceted relationship between the United States and Western European allies,
highlighting how will to power and economic questions played a crucial part in a
conflict traditionally described as ideologically driven. Cf. Cain, F. (2007). Economic
Statecraft During the Cold War: European Responses to the US Embargo, Routledge, London;
Dobson, A. P. (2012). US Economic Statecraft for Survival 1933–1991: Of Embargoes,
Strategic Embargoes, and Economic Warfare, Routledge, London; Førland, T. E. (1991).
‘“Selling Firearms to the Indians”: Eisenhower’s Export Control Policy, 1953–1954’,
Diplomatic History, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 221–249; Jackson, I. (2001). The Economic Cold
War: America, Britain, and East-West Trade, 1948–1963, Palgrave, New York.
25 On the impact of such economic and technological exchanges on Eastern
European transition, see, among others: Autio-Sarasmo, S. and Miklossy, K. (eds)
(2011). Reassessing Cold War Europe, Routledge, London. On trade and technology
exchanges, see also: Eloranta, J. and Ojala, J. (eds) (2005). East–West Trade and the
Cold War, University of Jyvaskala, Jyvaskala. On the increasing interaction between
East and West in the framework of détente, see: Romano, R. and Romero, F. (2014).
‘Special Issue: European Socialist Regimes Facing Globalization and European Co-
operation: Dilemmas and Responses’, European Review of History, Vol. 21, Issue 2.
26 See: Eckstein, Communist China’s Economic Growth.
27 ‘[ . . . ] in 1957 there was a significant drop in Soviet export to China, as reported
in “Vneshnyaya torgovlya” n. 10 (October 1958)’. The National Archives (TNA), FC
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There was frequent dissent among American allies regarding the
necessity of keeping a different—and stricter—list for China. Not
all governments agreed that the size and strength of the industrial
base would decide the outcome of a war between the capitalist and
the Socialist blocs. The British thought that the next war would be
a short nuclear one, and any restriction on the enemy’s industrial
development was irrelevant.28 Britain never made any secret of the
fact that it considered the PRC to be a valuable trading partner and
accompanied this with formal recognition as early as1950. The French
were not keen on the embargo but before de Gaulle’s presidency, they
maintained a soft approach: though encouraging the initiatives of
individuals in the commercial field, the government strictly contained
Sino-French trade within the limits of the embargo. In Italy in
the 1950s a group of intellectuals, businessmen, and politicians
repeatedly asked the government to send an official trade delegation
to China and to soften the embargo.29 British commercial interests in
China challenged its alliance with the United States, culminating in
the former withdrawing from Chincom in 1957. All other member
countries, except for the United States, followed the British. The
effects of such a liberating move were immediately evident. From
1957 to 1958 the value of West German and British exports to China
surpassed those from East Germany and Czechoslovakia.
As Liu demonstrates in her pioneering 1971 study, the import of
fertilizers—especially during the 1950s—was crucial to China so that
it could expand its textile exports and, consequently, be able to pay
for capital goods. The main producers of fertilizers were Japan and
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries
(see Table 1). Until 1958, China’s fertilizer imports from these
countries increased fast, reaching 77 per cent of the total. In 1959
1121/14. Despatch of the British Embassy in Moscow to the Northern Department,
Foreign Office, 6 November 1958.
28 East-West trade discussion in Washington, 4 March 1962, T 312/612, PRO.
Quoted in Cain, F. (2005).‘Computers and the Cold War: United States Restrictions
on the Export of Computers to the Soviet Union and Communist China’, Journal of
Contemporary History, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 131–147.
29 The most exemplary case is the Center for the Development of Cultural and
Economic Relations with China (Centro Cina), founded in 1953 and directed by
the anti-fascist intellectual, Ferruccio Parri. For a description of the activities of the
Center, see: Samarani, G. (2014). ‘Roma e Pechino negli anni della Guerra Fredda:
il ruolo del Centro Studi per le relazioni culturali ed economiche con la Cina’, in
Meneguzzi, G. and Samarani, G. (eds), La Cina di Mao, l’Italia e l’Europa negli anni della
Guerra fredda, Il Mulino, Bologna, pp. 93–118.
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Table 1
Chinese fertilizer imports from Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries.
Belgium-
Luxembourg Canada France
West
Germany Italy
The
Netherlands Norway Portugal Sweden
Great
Britain
Total
OECD
1953 57 – – 22 – – – – – 13 92
(2,6) (1,2) (0,7) (4,5)
1954 – – – 22 – – – – – 2 24
(1,0) (0,1) (1,1)
1955 106 19 – 236 – – – – – – 361
(5,5) (1,0) (12,5) (19,0)
1956 264 49 – 258 – 67 1 – – 3 642
(13,3) (2,5) (13,4) (3,3) (0,1) (0,1) (32,7)
1957 292 18 – 248 154 30 – – – – 742
(13,6) (0,9) (13,6) (8,4) (1,4) (37,9)
1958 414 – – 430 150 80 3 – – – 1077
(16,4) (18,2) (7,6) (3,0) (0,3) (45,5)
1959 398 – – 202 361 68 24 15 – – 1068
(14,3) (7,8) (14,1) (2,5) (2,1) (0,3) (41,1)
1960 251 – 10 232 287 64 7 – – – 851
(8,0) (0,3) (7,6) (10,6) (2,0) (0,5) (29,0)
1961 248 – 31 121 369 47 23 – – – 839
(7,6) (0,8) (3,6) (12,7) (1,6) (1,6) (27,9)
1962 218 – 136 230 256 52 – – – – 892
(5,9) (3,5) (6,8) (8,6) (1,4) (26,2)
1963 231 – 283 173 413 146 44 – – – 1290
(6,8) (6,5) (4,7) (12,1) (3,9) (2,8) (36,8)
1964 60 – – 12 16 8 – – – – 76
(1,7) (0,3) (0,7) (0,2) (2,4)
1965 107 – 207 51 253 147 – – 4 41 810
(4,7) (7,0) (2,2) (12,2) (6,6) (0,4) (1,8) (34,8)
Source: Liu Jung-Chao (1971). China’s Fertilizer Economy, Aldine Publishing, Chicago.
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Japan was excluded for political reasons, then it gradually made
a comeback, passing Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development countries in 1964–66.30 The changes in the percentage
of total imports show that the Chinese market played an important
role in the (chemical) fertilizer industries of the exporting countries.
Belgium and West Germany led the market until 1958, then it
was the turn of France, Italy and the Netherlands.31 Import–export
policies acquire a much more complex aspect when we analyse
the activities of Western European industrialists in China. Among
the leading European chemical companies (Bayer, Hoechst, BASF,
Rhone Poulenc, ICI, Vickers-Zimmer, Montecatini), we find ANIC, a
subsidiary of the Italian state energy company, ENI. ANIC’s deal(s)
in the mid-1950s provided a timely opportunity for it to gain an
advantage in the struggle against its main competitor, the Italian
private company Montecatini.
As already pointed out, among the companies interested in the
Chinesemarket were those that had been involved inChina’s economy
during the period of semi-colonial exploitation and who decided to
continue to do business with China after 1949. The case of British
companies is unusual because of the British colonial presence in
Hong Kong. Moreover, since Britain never severed official ties with
China, several British business delegations were already visiting the
country in 1953. Most notably, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation and the Chartered Bank were the only Western banks
allowed on Chinese territory throughout the Mao years.32 Some
West German companies resumed business with China very early on:
BASF was operating through the German-Danish trading company,
Jebsen, by 1956.33 Bayer, Mannesmann, and Verein Deutschen
30 In 1952, Chinese and Japanese signed their first private commercial agreement
of the post-Second World War era. During the Cold War, economic relations were
always at risk because of politics. For an informed analysis, see: Soeya, Y. (1998).
Japan’s Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945–1978, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
31 Until now the most exhaustive study on the chemical fertilizer sector and on the
commerce between China and North Atlantic countries is: Liu, Jung-Chao (1971).
China’s Fertilizer Economy, Aldine Publishing, Chicago.
32 On the British case, see also: Boardman, R. (1976). Britain and the People’s Republic
of China, 1949–1974, MacMillan, London; Tuck-Hong Tang, J. (1992). Britain’s
Encounter with Revolutionary China, 1949–1954, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke;
Timberlake, P. P. (1994). The Story of the Icebreakers in China, The 48 Group Club,
London.
33 Grabicki, M. (2015). Breaking New Ground. The History of BASF in China from 1885
to Today, Hoffmann und Kampe Verlag, Hamburg.
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Maschinenbau visited China in 1957 along with a semi-official
organization which signed a private trade agreement with the China
Council, regulating exchanges of goods for DM100,000.34 Between
1956 and 1957, two French trade delegations visited China; they
comprised representatives of French institutions and of important
companies, such as Schneider, Alsthom, Neyrpic, Saint-Gobain, and
Pechiney.35 In the mid-1950s Italy’s biggest chemical company,
Montecatini, signed many contracts in China through Comet, a
trading company led by politician and middleman, Dino Gentili, who
had special ties with the Italian Socialist Party.36
The early 1960s as a turning point in China’s industrialization
strategy and self-reliance
Whereas the 1950s witnessed a rapidly industrializing China, the
1960s show a much different picture: the Great Leap Forward caused
the death of millions, while the ideological dispute with Moscow
became serious and China found herself isolated and needy. In the
early part of the decade, China had to turn to the West to import
grain to lift its population out of starvation. The sustained upward
trend of imports up until 1959 was followed by a sharp drop from
1960 to 1962, which in turn was followed by a gradual recovery;
by 1966 the volume of international commerce had again reached
the 1959 peak (see Table 2). As soon as the country recovered from
the worst consequences of the Great Leap Forward, relations with
Western European industrialists entered a new, more ‘professional’
phase. The first signs were seen in late 1961, when the Chinese
purchased Viscount aircrafts from the British manufacturer, Vickers.
The year 1962 saw a revival of interest in the fertilizer market, this
time also aimed at developing production facilities. In 1963, the
Chinese bought a urea production plant from the Dutch company,
Continental Engineering (V.N.F. Stork Verkspoor), which was the
trigger for the purchase of equipment, patents, and know-how to build
34 On the German case, see Bernardini’s article in this special issue.
35 On the French case, see Romano’s article in this special issue.
36 For a detailed analysis of Gentili’s endeavours with China, cf.: Capisani, L.
(2013). ‘Dino Gentili, la Comet e il dialogo commerciale fra Italia e Cina (1952–
58)’, Studi Storici, no. 2, pp. 419–447.
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ammonia plants from the Italian firm, Montecatini, and of a synthetic
ammonia plant from the British company, Humphreys and Glasgow.
In the same period, the effects of the ideological dispute with
Moscow left China isolated in the Socialist bloc. During the early
1960s—in response to China’s independence from the Soviet Union—
the country increased its strategy of self-reliance, which included
testing the first atomic bomb and expanding explorations in oil
production, oil imports, as well as in the import of pipes and refining
plants.
Although the 1960s brought the discovery of new oil fields,
China was never able to produce all types of oil, and constantly
looked for new providers. From 1963 to 1966, Chinese import–
export corporations were very active buying technology, machinery,
and plant from all over the world. Notwithstanding the Sino-Soviet
dispute, China was still able to obtain oil rigs, turbo drills, seismic
equipment, and core sampling plant fromHungary,Romania, andEast
Germany.37 They also obtained catalytic cracking and platforming
technology made with American technology and imported from
Cuba.38
The Chinese entered negotiations for oil refineries and petroleum
equipment with the German firm, Lurgi; French firms, Speichem and
Technip; and Italian firm, ENI. The Chinese also targeted metal and
machinery companies, for example, the German firm, Mannesmann,
and Italian company, Innocenti. By 1962 it was clear that the Sino-
Soviet split would not have an easy resolution, and the Chinesemarket
became ever more alluring for Western companies. The year 1963
marked the emergence of uncertainty and ambivalence in America’s
China policy, fuelled by the debate on what was best for American
business interests. Chincom forbade the sale of petrol, as well as
the sale of ‘petroleum refinery equipment’ and ‘oil well drilling
and exploration equipment’, which were specifically mentioned on
the British lists.39 Nevertheless, many grey areas allowed trading
opportunities that crossed the boundaries of capitalist and Socialist
blocs. In order to start producing planes, China needed to buy fuel
and lubricants from abroad. Although the United States had placed
a ban on American companies trading with China, they knew that
37 Mitcham, China’s Economic Relations with the West, p. 122.
38 Ibid.
39 Goods appearing on the consolidated list of goods embargoed for China by
England in June 1951. Cf. Board of Trade Journal, 8 November 1957.
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Table 2
Direction of Socialist China’s foreign trade, 1952–63, adjusted (in per cent).
Imports 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
Communist countries,
total
79.4 82.6 82.5 78.3 72.2 63.5 60.0 67.6 65.0 47.7 40.5 33.5
Soviet Union 62.2 63.0 60.2 56.6 50.0 39.1 34.0 47.4 42.7 25.9 20.5 14.3
Eastern Europe (16.1) (18.0) (19.8) 17.9 18.0 (20.4) 22.0 16.2 17.8 11.6 6.8 (6.9)
Asian Communist
countries
(1.1) 1.6 2.4 3.8 4.1 (4.0) (4.0) (4.0) (4.4) (10.2) (13.2) (12.2)
Cuba —- —- 0.1 Negl. —- —- 0.2 Negl. 1.7 6.5 7.8
Non-Communist
countries, total
20.6 17.5 17.4 21.6 27.9 36.5 39.8 32.4 33.4 45.8 51.7 66.5
Exports
Communist countries,
total
66.7 66.0 72.8 69.1 66.1 66.7 66.5 71.5 64.7 57.2 53.4 45.1
Soviet Union 47.8 45.8 51.7 47.8 47.4 45.7 46.1 49.5 42.2 34.9 32.3 24.2
Eastern Europe (16.9) (17.6) (17.2) 17.2 14.7 (15.4) 15.4 15.9 15.7 10.4 9.2 (9.1)
Asian Communist
countries
(2.1) 2.6 4.0 4.1 4.0 (5.6) (5.0) (6.1) (6.9) (11.9) (11.9) (11.8)
Cuba —- —- —- —- —- —- —- —- 0.5 5.3 6.1 54.9
Non-Communist
countries, total
33.3 34.0 27.2 30.9 33.8 33.3 33.5 28.5 34.7 37.5 40.5
Source: Eckstein, Communist China Economic Growth, p. 286.
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148 VALERIA ZANIER
it would be hard to prevent Western European companies from
trading in those items, especially British and Dutch companies, which
continued to own large storage tanks along China’s coastal ports, from
where they could easily provide petrol to Chinese government-owned
companies.40
ENI’s economic interests and Mattei’s international vision
The narrative of this article will closely follow the case of Italy’s
state holding, ENI. The company was founded in 1953 in an effort
to restyle the energy sector and give the Italian government a
strong hold over the sector.41 The new holding company was given
shares in Agenzia Generale Italiana Petroli (the national energy
distribution company created by the fascist regime), SocietàNazionale
Metanodotti (an engineering company), Nuovo Pignone (amechanical
company acquired in 1954), and ANIC (a chemical company). Given
the extremely strong and promising conditions of the Italian chemical
and petrochemical sectors in the mid-1950s, it was hoped that
this bold state project would be very successful. History has shown
that the Italian government’s reconstruction and economic planning
was flawed. Above all, its basic decision to provide help to the
Italian Mezzogiorno (southern Italy) by mandatory redirection of
some companies’ investments to the region, caused damage to a
promising industry without bringing any positive improvement to
those affected areas. Eventually, the efforts of ENI and its competitor,
Montecatini, to keep up with other international actors clashed when
the commitment to help develop the Italian Mezzogiorno (along with
a number of other wrong financial decisions) distracted considerable
resources from more successful projects.
The history of the Italian holding is tightly linked to ENI’s first
president, Enrico Mattei, a gifted entrepreneur and a man with keen
political acumen. He took advantage of two favourable historical
junctures: first, in the post-Second World War years Italy was taking
off as an industrial power and as a consumer society; second, the oil
industry was in ascension and Italy, Germany, France, and Japan—
40 See: Cain, Economic Statecraft During the Cold War.
41 ENI was created by law no. 136 passed on 10 February 1953, which became
operational on 11 April of the same year. Enrico Mattei became chairman on 4March
1953. Cf. www.eni.com , [accessed 13 July 2016].
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the four largest consumers of oil products after the United States and
Britain—had an opportunity to take independent economic action
and acquire more political status. In the political realm, Mattei had
solid alliances, as he had fought during the war as a partisan and
acquired an anti-fascist reputation. Moreover, he had embraced the
ideals of the progressive left-wing Italian Catholics, and developed
a close friendship with some important figures who had played a
role in founding Italy’s Christian Democratic Party (Democrazia
Cristiana). Such ideals included a belief in strong state intervention
in the economy and a leading role for the managers of state-owned
companies. During the Reconstruction years, the Italian government
deliberately chose to put state companies into competition with the
private actors in areas where the state did not have any monopoly.
This needs be underlined here, for ENI was the expression of such
political will. Men like Mattei were deliberately chosen because
the political class of the time—though responsible for making such
decisions—did not have a clear commitment to economic planning.
The rivalries and the ideological ambiguities within the Christian
Democrats meant that almost every decision was put in the hands of
the managers, which meant that they needed to have great personal
ability.42
In 1948 the Christian Democrats won the absolute majority in the
elections. This gave Mattei a great opportunity, as he was chosen
to manage the transformation of the state energy sector. The main
problem he had to confront was the lack of vertical integration in
the group. ENI had direct control over natural gas, as resources were
available in the Po Valley in northern Italy. In the case of petrol, the
group’s companies would refine and process crude oil and sell the final
products, but did not have the advantage of having direct control over
crude reserves.43 The lack of cheap and controllable sources made
ENI much weaker in comparison to other competitors, and this was
identified byMattei as one of the crucial issues to tackle when drawing
up anew strategy. In order to fully understand the reasons at the root of
the group’s actions, we need also to take into account two important
areas where Mattei put in a lot of effort: the building of a strong
42 Carnevali, F. (2000). ‘State Enterprise and Italy’s “EconomicMiracle”: The Ente
Nazionale Idrocarburi, 1945–1962’, Enterprise and Society, Vol. 1, Issue 2, June 2000,
pp. 249–278.
43 Regarding the lack of vertical integration, see: Pozzi, D. (2010). Dai gatti selvaggi
al cane a sei zampe’, Enterprise and Society, Vol. 11, Issue 2, pp. 414–416; Carnevali,
‘State Enterprise and Italy’s “Economic Miracle”’.
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hydrocarbon distribution network, which was realized through the
Central European Line; and the strengthening of the petrochemical
industry.44
Using ENI’s research and facilities, as well as harnessing his
entrepreneurial attitude and his political capital, Mattei succeeded
in finding diversified and cheap sources of oil. His main achievement
was to fill the gaps in the world oil industry, which by the mid-
1950s was facing an imminent crisis in the post-Second World War
balance. Making use of the horizontal integration offered by the many
specialties of ENI’s subsidiaries, starting with the agreement signed
with Iran in 1956, ENI developed what has been called ‘formula
Mattei’ or ‘formula ENI’: a joint venture in which the producing
countries and foreign companies had an equal share in profits.45
This kind of contract was also called 75 per cent–25 per cent; the
case of Iran exemplifies how they operated. In 1957, AGIP Mineraria
(ENI’s subsidiary) and the National Iranian Oil Corporation formed
a joint venture, the Societé Irano-Italienne des Petroles. The newly
formed venture would pay 50 per cent of its profits to the Iranian
state through royalties, rights, and taxes. The remaining 50 per cent
would be divided between AGIP Mineraria and the National Iranian
Oil Corporation. Being a national company of the Iranian state, the
outcomewas that, for the first time producing countries were receiving
75 per cent of the profits.46 Of course, ENI would compensate for
this loss by securing more contracts to provide technology and plants
through its subsidiaries.
ENI’s outward strategy included agreements with Egypt (1954),
Iran (1956), and the Soviet Union (1960). In many cases, ENI-
designed agreements included machinery and plants, which were
provided by its subsidiaries, thus multiplying business opportunities.
The cheap energy would prove decisive in ‘fuelling’ the Italian
economic miracle. Though ENI’s actions under Mattei’s leadership
have often been defined as an Italian ‘parallel diplomacy’, in reality
the group did not fully coordinate with the government. Mattei always
adhered to the political current of the left-wing Christian Democrats,
albeit frequently being much bolder and more reckless than his
44 Pozzi, ‘Dai gatti selvaggi al cane a sei zampe’; Venanzi, F. and Faggiani, M. (eds)
(1994). ENI: un’autobiografia, Sperling and Kupfer editori, Milano.
45 According to Pozzi, it was the National Iranian Oil Corporation, not ENI, who
invented the formula. See: Pozzi, ‘Dai gatti selvaggi al cane a sei zampe’, p. 412.
46 Cf. Venanzi and Faggiani (eds), ENI: un’autobiografia, p. 33.
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spokespeople. His independent attitude soon started to attract hatred
and criticism. The State Department of the United States openly
accused him of destroying the system of royalties and lowering oil
prices. Mattei’s career in ENI lasted nine years, ending abruptly with
his untimely death in October 1962.47
The ‘parallel diplomacy’ conducted by ENI’s president was a salient
issue with respect to the American-Italian relationship, often arousing
suspicion in American officials over the reliability of their Italian
counterparts. For these reasons, the American administration strictly
monitored both Mattei and ENI, which involved coordinating the
efforts of the CIA and American diplomats. ENI’s actions intersected
with the official relationship between China and Italy on two main
occasions: in 1957–58 and in 1962–64.
The ENI group’s strategy for China
Enrico Mattei visited China in December 1958. He was received by
the Chinese with all the relevant honours: he met Marshal Chen
Yi, vice-minister of foreign affairs. He also met Nan Hanchen and Ji
Chaoding, respectively the chairman and the secretary- general of the
China Council, the non-governmental institution handling economic
and friendly contacts with non-Socialist countries.
Owing to Mattei’s high political profile, his visit to China has been
portrayed as a great achievement for Italy’s struggle to establish
an independent profile, away from American influence. American
intelligence failed to find out about the trip in advance, and only
received this information through the Italian press, which published
extensive and triumphant reports conveyed directly by ENI. The
day after Mattei’s arrival in China, the Central Intelligence Agency
published a bulletin, provocatively entitled ‘Italian oil czar seeking
trade deal with Communist China’.48 Although Prime Minister
47 The circumstances of Mattei’s death have given rise to very popular conspiracy
theories. Though such theories are not rooted in any source, after more than 50 years,
they still exert influence, even on valuable scholars. Cf. Buccianti, G. (2005). Enrico
Mattei. Assalto al potere petrolifero mondiale, Giuffré, Milano; Galli, G. (2005). Enrico
Mattei: petrolio e complotto italiano, Baldini Castoldi Dalai editore, Milano. A balanced
analysis of the existing literature is found in Pozzi, ‘Dai gatti selvaggi al cane a sei
zampe.’
48 Central Intelligence Agency Bulletin, 20 December 1958, in CIA CREST
Database.
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Amintore Fanfani denied knowing about the mission, this cannot be
true:Mattei skilfully proposed his trip to theChinese embassy in Bern,
selling it as a replacement of the Italian economic mission, which had
been planned since 1954, but which he knew for certain from his
political contacts would never have the chance to materialize. These
circumstances provoked a harsh reaction in James D. Zellerbach,
America’s ambassador to Rome. The conversation that he had
with Prime Minister Fanfani shows that the American government
had long been observing not only Mattei, but also the ambiguous
inclination shared by Italian businessmen and politicians towards
trading eastwards:
Mattei, like so many Italian businessmen, desires to increase trade wherever
it can be done profitably. He sees no reason why Italy should not trade with
the Soviet bloc and Communist China.49
After an early enthusiastic reaction in favour of the PRC in
1950, Italy had shown an ambiguous attitude towards diplomatic
recognition.50 Loyalty to the United States, which had economic and
political, butmost of all security,motivations, caused deep fears within
Italian political parties and brought a heavy influence to bear on the
government’s attitude towards trade. Like other allied countries that
relied on American financial help and military protection, Italy was in
a delicate position with regard to pursuing an independent policy. In
addition, after the Second World War, Italy was the country with by
far the strongest Communist party in Western Europe. This last fact
particularly fuelled American fears of Italy ‘going Communist’ and
motivated close monitoring of the country’s political situation.51
Initiating commercial contacts with the Chinese had been carefully
planned, using political and commercial levers. The first documented
(though indirect) contact happened in June 1954 when the Italian
businessman, Dino Gentili, first proposed ENI’s interests to the
49 RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Research and Analysis
Branch (OSS) and Bureau of Intelligence Research, Intelligence Reports, October
1951–August 1961, 7631–7674, Box 319, Folder: Report N. 7912, 31 December
1958.
50 The episode is narrated in Pini, M. F. (2013). Italia e Cina. 60 anni tra passato e
futuro, L’Asino d’oro, Roma.
51 National SecurityCouncil (NSC)5411/2 ‘USPolicy towards Italy’, RG59General
Records of the Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Records Relating to
National Security Council Policy Papers, 1947–1979, Lot 63D351 and 66D95, Entry
A1 1586E, From: NSC 5410Memoranda to: 5417Memoranda Box 32.
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Chinese delegation in Geneva.52 Direct contacts were started in
January 1958 when Franco Micucci Cecchi, a junior staff member
in ENI’s export department, visited the Commercial Office of the
PRC embassy in Bern, carrying a letter of recommendation from
former partisan, Ferruccio Parri, as his credentials.53 The commercial
attaché, Gao Shanglin, officially represented the China National
Import–Export Corporation inWestern Europe.54 Cecchi visited Bern
again in April, bringing further information that would be useful for
the first sale of ammonium sulphate. In June, ENImarketingmanager,
Giuseppe Ratti, and Wang Dexin, representative of China National–
Import Export Corporation, carried out negotiations in Bern. Ratti,
together with ENI vice-president, Eugenio Cefis, met Wang in Bern
in July 1958 and later on, alone, in the autumn. At this last meeting,
Ratti checkedwith the consul whether a delegation led byMattei could
take part in the Italian economic mission, which had been planned
since 1954 and had again been delayed (Missione Guglielmone).
In the summer of 1958 Mattei visited the PRC embassy in Bern,
and successfully negotiated the ENI group’s visit to Beijing as a
replacement of the non-official trade delegation to China.
In organizing ENI’s first mission to China, Mattei deployed all his
political contacts. The trip was partly orchestrated with the help of
Giuseppe Regis, a corresponding journalist for the Italian Communist
Party’s newspaper, l’Unità, who lived in Beijing and also acted as a
commercial intermediary.55 Mattei’s contacts with the Chinese were
also facilitated by the Christian Democrat mayor of Florence, Giorgio
La Pira.
At the time of Mattei’s trip to China, Sino-Italian negotiations were
blocked. The two governments had initially agreed on a first step
of setting up trade representative offices in each country. However,
the Chinese wanted full diplomatic recognition to accompany the
exchange of commercial offices, but Italy had too many political
constraints to proceed with this. Mattei certainly discussed politics
with the vice-minister of foreign affairs, Chen Yi, yet there is
no evidence that they explicitly addressed the issue of diplomatic
52 INSMLI, Fondo Dino Gentili, Letter n. 175, Comet Rome to Comet Beijing, 7
February 1955.
53 Archivio Storico ENI (hereafter: ASE), Fondo ENI, Relazioni Esterne, b. 56.
54 Ibid.
55 Ratti’s memories of the 1958 China trip are reported in: Venanzi and Faggiani
(eds), ENI: un’autobiografia.
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recognition.56 In 1960 and 1961Mattei paid further visits to Chinese
diplomatic personnel in Switzerland, though unfortunately little has
been preserved in ENI’s archives about thesemissions. During his visit
to Geneva in March 1961, Mattei also arranged a second meeting
with Marshal Chen Yi; there are references in the records to the
two speaking of China-Italy political relations, as well as of ENI’s
business with China,57 but these are fragments reported by the
marketing manager, Giuseppe Ratti. Ratti, who worked so closely
on the group’s international strategy that he was described as ENI’s
minister of foreign affairs, attached a political meaning to Mattei’s
trip.58 He believed that, having already opened a road to the Soviet
Union, Mattei could make a difference in breaking China’s complete
isolation.However, evenRattimade nomention of specific Sino-Italian
political issues being addressed by Mattei when he met with Chinese
personalities. Unfortunately, Mattei’s political papers are lost and it
is therefore impossible to know exactly what political aims the ENI
president pursued with the Chinese and how feasible he thought his
proposals were.
A careful examination of the available documents shows that
Mattei was rather pragmatic and that an economic strategy prevailed
over whatever political vision he might have had of Chinese-Italian
diplomatic relations. Already in the mid-1950s it was well known
among European companies that China was in dire need of fertilizers,
especially nitrate-enhanced products, since the Chinese soil lacked
this element.59 By the time of Mattei’s visit to Beijing, ANIC—the
chemical subsidiary of ENI group—had already signed two contracts
with the China National Import–Export Corporation for the total sale
of 30,000metric tonnes of ammonium calcium nitrate.
Immediate profits in the chemicals trade pushed ENI’s first contacts
with China and provided a timely opportunity to strengthen ANIC
in the competition with its main national rival, Montecatini. The
56 Cf. Samarani, G. (2007). ‘Enrico Mattei e la Cina’, in Guarnieri, D. (ed.),
Enrico Mattei. Il comandante partigiano, l’uomo politico, il manager di stato, Istituto di Storia
Contemporanea, Ferrara, pp. 91–98.
57 Cf. Perrone, N. (2001). Enrico Mattei, Il Mulino, Bologna, p. 109. Perrone’s text is
based on the recollections of Alvise Savorgnan di Brazzà, ENI’s chief public relations
officer. The fact that the mission had such a political content could explain why it is
not documented in the ENI Archives.
58 This description was made by Aldo Moro, Italian statesman and one of the
most influential figures among the left-wing Christian Democrats. Cf. Venanzi and
Faggiani (eds), ENI: un’autobiografia, p. 196.
59 Liu, China’s Fertilizer Economy.
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commercial battle had started at the end of the Second World War,
with the competition to acquire mining concessions in the Po Valley,
which ANIC secured in the end.60
After the trip led byMattei, the group and its subsidiaries exchanged
visits, and made commercial inquiries and counter-offers, mainly
relying on the commercial attaché in Bern. ANIC had some success in
trading fertilizers, while reporting a less enthusiastic response to its
own engineered synthetic rubber, Europrene. In 1958 ANIC signed
two contracts: the first one for the sale of ammonium nitrate; the
second one for ammonium sulphate and ammonium calcium nitrate.
At the time of Mattei’s trip to China in December 1958, ANIC’s
representative, Ratti, andChinaNational Import–ExportCorporation
representative, Wang Dexin, had just signed a second contract in The
Hague (on 29 October 1958). 61
Aside from the trade in chemicals, which was never ENI’s main
focus, the group cultivated the Chinese market for the extraction,
refinery, and production of materials from oil. ENI’s interest in
cooperating regarding the extraction, refinery and derivatives from
oil had already emerged in 1956, when ENI subsidiary, Società
Nazionale Metanodotti, sent the young engineer, Giovanni Muratori,
on an exploratory trip to China. Muratori reported that, although
oil production was not considerable, the PRC’s new government was
financing large investments in extraction, thus confirming what we
now know to be one of the biggest experiments in China’s industrial
history.
Muratori highlighted that the perforation and transportation of oil
wells represented quite a serious problem because of China’s vast
territory. This had the potential to provide an interesting opportunity
for future cooperation, but he underlined that the time was not yet
right.
It is interesting to note that Giovanni was the son of Spartaco
Muratori, an engineer who had worked as a senior consultant for the
Italian trading company, Comet, and was actually based in Beijing at
the time his son was undertaking his exploratory trip. There is reason
to believe that, following Gentili representing ENI’s interests in Bern
60 After the discovery and exploitation of a big natural gas field in Ravenna, ENI
started its adventure in the chemical industry. As the productive capacity of the
Ravenna field far exceeded heating needs for northern Italy, the company diverted
them for industrial use. Cf. Colitti, M. (2008). ENI. Cronache dall’interno di un’azienda,
EGEA, Milano, pp. 168–169.
61 ASE, Fondo ENI, Relazioni Esterne, b. 56.
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in 1955, Mattei and Gentili finalized an agreement, and Spartaco
helped his son in setting up some crucial contacts.62 Giovanni was
received by the vice-director of the Institute of the Petroleum Industry
and by a number of high-level officials, who were to become key figures
in the development of Società Nazionale Metanodotti’s cooperation in
petroleum processing.
Though no documents show how preparations for the mission
proceeded, it was certainly not by chance that Muratori junior carried
out his scouting mission whenMattei—having finished ‘restyling’ ENI
and its associates—was exploring new routes for Società Nazionale
Metanodotti.63 During this phase, the group’s main purpose was
to acquire new providers of oil. The strategy included extensive
exploratory activities, spanning a wide geographical range fromAfrica
to Asia and various parts of the Soviet Union.
It is important to note how the outward expansion activity was a
defining characteristic of AGIP Mineraria from its very inception. In
this respect, Mattei’s actions were a continuation of this pattern; in
many cases he had pre-existing contacts in countries such as the Soviet
Union, which had been Italy’s major source of oil during the fascist
regime, and Libya.
Overall, the exploratory and expansion phase, which culminated in
1956–57, saw no immediate returns; the costs of these activities would
only be seen after Mattei’s death. The Chinese case is no different.
Here, the outcome was influenced by the internal situation in China,
namely the Great Leap Forward.
Mao’s ‘petroleum rush’
The relevance of the first contact between the Società Nazionale
Metanodotti and China in 1956 acquires more importance when it
is connected with Mao’s push to develop the petroleum industry.
The Communists inherited a few small petroleum fields in the
northwest (notably, Yumen) and a shale plant in Manchuria from
62 INSMLI, Fondo Dino Gentili, Nota di Spartaco Muratori a Dino Gentili, 9 Aprile
1956. Although it is not possible to find such an agreement, this document confirms
that in Beijing, Spartaco was waiting for his son’s arrival alongside ENI’s mission.
63 ENI Archives have not preserved anything other thanGiovanniMuratori’s report
of the exploratory mission. Giovanni Muratori only worked at the Società Nazionale
Metanodotti for a short period, after which he was employed in the long term by
CERN in Geneva.
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the Nationalists.64 With the help of Soviet experts, an assessment
was made that a much larger area of the country was likely to
offer prospects for oil extraction. From 1949 to 1955 the number
of geological workers in China increased from 18 to 6,000.65 Between
1950 and 1958 Fushun functioned as a nationalmodel, and from 1958
to 1962 Yumen became the centrepiece of the PRC’s oil industry.
Eventually, when neither Fushun nor Yumen could fulfil the country’s
energy needs, in 1963 Daqing emerged as the PRC’s new model
oilfield.66 During the 1950s China’s investment in the petroleum
industry increased constantly, reaching a peak in1958–62, when three
major oilfields—Daqing, Shengli, and Dagang—were discovered.67 At
this time, the Sino-Soviet split not only precludedRussian cooperation,
but also hampered contributions fromother Socialist bloc countries. As
a result, Western Europe became a source for obtaining the necessary
technology.
In 1958 Deng Xiaoping was appointed vice-premier with special
responsibility for the petrol-chemical sector, and the Institute of the
Petroleum Industry was transformed into the more powerful Ministry
of the Petroleum Industry.68 The most critical aspect of Mao’s 1958
decisions regarding petroleum industry policy was the deployment of
the People’s Liberation Army in the form of a ‘Petroleum Division’
of about 30,000 army troops. Evidence shows that Daqing was less
the product of selfless proletarian work and more a carefully planned
operation. Many of the leaders appointed by the Great Helmsman
at the head of the Ministry of the Petroleum Industry could boast
a loyal revolutionary past and were thus already very familiar with
the military: Yu Qiuli, the newly appointed minister, was a Long
March veteran; other leaders, such as Kang Shi’en, Tang Ke, and Song
64 The Yumen oilfield was already known to the Chinese before the founding of the
PRC: ‘In October 1939 Sun Jianchu finished his first report on Yumen titled Gansu
Yumen Youtian Dizhi Baogao (Geological Report on the Oilfields of Gansu Yumen),
completing one of the earliest comprehensive indigenously-generated geological
reports of China’s oil resources in modern times.’ Cf. Shen, Zhongguo Shiyou Gongye
Fazhan Shi [A History of the World Oil Industry], p. 33, quoted in Lim, China’s Quest
for Self-reliance in Oil.
65 Cf.Cheng,Chu-yuan (1976).China’s Petroleum Industry.Output andGrowth, Praeger,
New York.
66 Lim, China’s Quest for Self-reliance in Oil, p. 144.
67 Cheng Chu-yuan (1984). The Demand and Supply of Primary Energy in Mainland
China, Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, Taipei; distributed by
University of Washington Press, Seattle, p. 160.
68 Cf. Lieberthal, K. and Oksenberg, M. (1986). Bureaucratic Policy and Chinese Energy
Development, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, p. 66.
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Zhenming all came from themilitary and some of themhad experience
in the field. Kang Shi’en, for example, was a geologist and had received
training in the Soviet Union. As a further enhancement of the strength
of this group, leading officials from the Ministry were supported by
extremely capable engineers and technicians. This group of experts
was responsible of the exploitation of Daqing and, ultimately, for
its miraculous success, which fuelled the proletarian demagogical
discourse of the early 1960s. The leaders of the Ministry proved to be
highly capable as well as non-conventional in that they very effectively
related to foreigners. The so-called ‘petroleum faction’ receivedMao’s
praise and protection. In 1963–65YuQiuli and his close partners were
among the officials appointed by Mao to be the new architects of the
Third Five Year Plan.69
Whether by chance or by calculation, the year of Mattei’s visit to
China—1958—proved to be a good year for ENI to start cooperating
with China. Following the enquiries made by the Italians during their
December 1958 visit, Chinese officials began to show the first signs of
interest in petrochemical and oil products. In the spring of 1959 they
sent a technical mission to visit ENI’s plants. The delegation was led
by Liu Fang, vice-president of the Chinese Association of Chemistry
and the Chemical Industry, and included two members of the China
Council: Chen Fengping, deputy director of the research department,
and Liao Heshu, attaché. Most notably, three engineers from the
Ministry of the Petroleum Industry also took part.Having been defined
by the China Council itself as a ‘technical’ mission, the delegation
did not include representatives of import–export corporations, as this
would have attached a ‘commercial’ aspect to the visit. The delegation
spent ten days in Italy and visited Nuovo Pignone, ANIC, STANIC,
the IROM Refinery, and Cortemaggiore. The latter was a car fuel
distributing company, and IROMwas the group’smain refinery. Based
in PortoMarghera, Venice, it was a joint venture between ENI and BP.
The abovementioned visit did not bring any concrete developments
in the perforation, refinery, or the petrochemical fields, but this
was probably intentional. During 1959 China’s economy was moving
rapidly, the technical aid provided by the Soviets had not yet reached
69 Other leading characters in the petroleum industry were: Gu Mu, Sun Jingwen,
and Lin Hujia. Some of them went on to become principal economic specialists in the
mid-1970s (Yu, Kang, and Gu), while others led key ministries and became the links
between the top leaders and the bureaucracy (Tang, Song, and Sun). Cf. Lieberthal
and Oksenberg, Bureaucratic Policy.
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completion, and the Great Leap Forward had not yet turned into a
disaster.
In the autumn of 1959, a delegation from ENI was invited to take
part in the 10-year celebrations of the founding of the PRC. Mattei
kindly declined the invitation, and Cefis and Ratti flew to Beijing to
represent the group. As a sign of the distinction accorded to them,
ENI delegates met high level Chinese officials such as Nan Hanchen
and Ji Chaoding, who had already met Mattei on ENI’s previous visit
to China.
Cefis andRatti alsomet the leaders of theChinaMachinery Import–
Export Corporation, which showed an interest in buying perforation
equipment and pipelines.70 They also met with the newly appointed
vice-minister of the Ministry of the Petroleum Industry, the same
Liu Fang who had led the technical mission to Italy just a few
months before.71 This time the Chinese leaders showed an interest
in exploration devices, compressors, and oil and natural gas pipes, and
asked for prices ‘in order to conduct a preliminary study and check
the convenience’.72 The interest shown was still limited, and did not
involve making any commitment, but it was nevertheless an opening.
The fact that Liu Fang, who in his previous, more technical capacity
had led the mission to Italy earlier in April, was among the hosts was
a very good sign of the continuity of China’s interest in the products
offered by the Italian company. This fact further proves that a Chinese
strategy had already been drawn up at the time the technical mission
took place. Now, in his new political role, Liu Fang was certainly there
to start negotiations based on the data that had been collected a few
months before.
Exploiting the potential: ENI’s engagement in the
petrochemical trade
In 1960 one more deal supported ENI’s decision to prioritize the
chemicals aspect of their business: the Chinese bought 17,000 tonnes
of rubber from ENI. In the latter part of that year, however, ENI
staff noticed a decline in Chinese interest. Although other providers
experienced this too, there is no mention of the domestic difficulties
70 ASE, Fondo ENI, Presidenza, b. 72.
71 ASE, Fondo ENI, Presidenza, b. 72. Relazione della missione ENI a Pechino, 27
Settembre–6 Ottobre 1959.
72 Ibid.
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in China at the time.73 We now know that during this period China
had been precipitated into the tragedy of the Great Leap Forward, but
it appears that until early 1961 no one in the West knew exactly what
was happening in China.74 In the tragic epilogue of the Great Leap
Forward, Mao Zedong and his faction kept out of politics for a while.75
Between 1960 and 1961, Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi took the lead
and started Economic Readjustment, which lasted until 1965.76 The
new policy not only offered new opportunities for chemical fertilizer
plants, but opened up the market to petrochemicals as well.77
In the latter part of 1961, as business was resuming, the ENI-
SocietàNazionaleMetanodotti visit toChinawas being planned.78 The
purpose of the visit was to discuss with relevant Chinese organizations
in Peking the possibility of collaborating in: drilling for oil and natural
gas; transporting oil and natural gas; oil refining, including provision of
complete refineries; and providing petrochemicals (including supplies
of plants, with particular reference to those based on natural gas),
chemicals (including nitrogenous fertilizers, synthetic rubber, and
other products) as well as instruments and automatic equipment.79
The Chinese wanted to keep the delegation’s arrival in China on
19 February 1962 a secret from the Italian authorities.80 This is
understandable: on the government front, Sino-Italian talks were
progressing at a much slower pace. In 1962 the Chinese invited
representatives of the Italian TradeCommission inHongKong to take
part in the Canton Fair for the first time. This led to the reopening of
73 ASE, Fondo ENI, Presidenza, b. 56. Memorandum senza firma, 8 Settembre
1960.
74 The CIA acknowledged the famine in China only in February 1961. Cf. Zhang
Shuguang, Economic Cold War, p. 244.
75 In December 1958 Mao stepped down as head of state. He was replaced by Liu
Shaoqi in the spring of 1959.
76 Under the new policy of ‘readjustment’ (of the pace of development),
‘consolidation’ (of existing plants), ‘reinforcement’ (of the weak links), and
‘improvement’ (of quality of products), by 1965, most of the industrial output had
attained 1958–59 levels. Cf. Cheng Chu-yuan (1971). The Economy of Communist China
1949–1969, University of Michigan, Center for Chinese Studies, Ann Arbor. pp. 4–5.
77 Document no. 010-002-00112 preserved in the Beijing Municipal Archives. The
document, drafted by the PRC Science and Technology Committee (
) and the Ministry of Oil Industry (),
is dated December 1962. It shows plans for the development of the oil industry over
the next 10 years (1963–1972), testifying to the PRC’s interest in obtaining foreign
cooperation.
78 ASE, ENI, Estero, b. 123. Lettera di Ratti, 15 dicembre 1961.
79 Ibid
80 ASE, ENI, Estero, b. 123. Lettera di Armani, 31 gennaio 1962.
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government talks about sending an official Italian economic delegation
to China.
Soon after the trip to China in March 1962, Ratti and Gao Xingsun
from the China National Technical Import–Export Corporation
negotiated the sale of a combined plant for the production of acetylene,
ammonium, and urea. The trip also received the political blessing of
Chen Yi, the vice-premier and foreign minister, who spent time with
the delegates. In these turbulent times, this was a clear signal that ENI
could count on China’s new economic leaders, although it is unclear
the extent to which the Italians knew about the power shift that had
taken place between Mao and the opposing factions.
Despite the confidentiality that the Chinese had asked for, however,
news of the mission and of the political blessing it had received soon
reached the Italian government. The Italian consul in Hong Kong
commented bitterly that the ENI representatives had not lent a hand
to the Italian government bodies, and only cared for their ownbusiness.
He noted that the Chinese even paid tribute to the delegation with
honours usually reserved for foreign MPs.81
By the time ENI signed a big contract with Morocco the inevitable
clash with the government had already taken place. Fanfani, who
was at this stage both premier and minister of foreign affairs,
refused Mattei’s participation in the official visit to Morocco that
he and the Italian president had organized. It appears that there
was an underlying tension between Mattei and the Italian political
authorities. In the case of Fanfani, the relationship was mixed: the
latter would never look for an open fight, but he was scared of Mattei’s
tough personality and aware that he could never control him.82
This time, the clash between ENI and the Italian government
happened against the backdrop of a very tense international
atmosphere. During the Kennedy years, the American economic
lobbies were not particularly happy to see Canada providing large
quantities of grain to China and urged Congress to revise America’s
China policy. However, as Kochavi’s book has shown, the Kennedy
administration did nothing to alleviate tensions between the United
81 ASE, ENI, Estero, b. 123. Telespresso n. 335/24 (12 marzo 1962) dal Console
Italiano a Hong Kong (Piero Guadagnini) al Ministero degli Affari Esteri e al
Ministero del Commercio Estero.
82 Cf. Maugeri, L. (1994). L’arma del petrolio. Questione petrolifera globale, guerra fredda e
politica italiana nella vicenda di Enrico Mattei, Loggia de’ Lanzi, Firenze.
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States and China.83 The United States reinforced its ties with Taiwan
and insisted that the Italians hamper the PRC’s desire to obtain
a seat at the United Nations. Although Italy was eager to at least
extend official economic recognition to China, the Americans had a
very strong influence on its policies and, as a result, the process was
delayed in the years 1962–1963.84
In his final report, Ratti, head of ENI’s delegation, mentioned
that China had just emerged from a terrible economic crisis. He
further referred to the fact that the Chinese had presented a long
list of requests for plants from the Società Nazionale Metanodotti.
The Italian company was capable of providing some of them directly
(petroleum processing), but in others (petrochemical products), it
would have to secure licences from other European companies.85 As
for fertilizers, during the same visit the Chinese complained about
the limited amounts that ANIC had sold them, despite having offered
China unconditional collaboration. Ratti explained to his co-workers
that the prices of the Chinese market were not appealing, but he
omitted to mention this to the China National Technical Import–
Export Corporation. In fact, during the negotiations, Ratti lamented
China’s lack of planning. As for synthetic rubber (Europrene), the
price offered by the Chinese for ANIC’s 7,000 tonnes, was too low, so
no deal was closed.
It appears that already by early 1962 the market for fertilizers
had become much too competitive and was not lucrative enough
for ENI. When in the autumn of the same year, most big Western
European chemical fertilizer producers formed the Zurich-based
cartel, NITREX AG, ENI did not join it. The cartel, formed with the
express purpose of coping with the vast buying power of developing
countries’ state trading organizations, sold 1.08 million tonnes of
fertilizer to the PRC.86 As observed by Liu, the formation of a
83 Kochavi, N. (2002). A Conflict Perpetuated: China Policy During the Kennedy Years,
Praeger, Westport, Connecticut.
84 For an analysis of Italian diplomatic relations with the PRC, see Meneguzzi
Rostagni’s article in this special issue.
85 ASE, ENI, Relazioni Esterne, b. 1. Ratti, Relazione Missione E.N.I. in Cina,
febbraio–marzo 1962.
86 Member firms of the cartel included: West Germany’s BASF AG, Hoechst
AG, Ruhr Stickstoff AG; Austria’s Oesterreichische Stickstoffwerke; Italy’s SEIFA;
Norway’s Norsk Hydro; The Netherlands’ Centraal Stickstoff-Verkoop-Kantoor n.v.;
Belgium’s COBELAZ Comptoir Belge de l’Azote; France’s Syndicat Professional de
l’Industrie des Engrais Azotes; and the Swiss LONZA AG (a non-exporting member).
See: Mitcham, China’s Economic Relations with the West, p. 98.
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cartel in chemical fertilizers was a coherent and much expected step,
since the prices set by Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development countries for China had remained nearly unchanged
throughout the 1950s.87
On 19December 1963, the Società Nazionale Metanodotti Progetti
and the China National Technical Import Corporation signed a
contract for the sale of a combined plant for the production of
aromatics, to be delivered within 18 months.88 The price requested
was US$5 million, which the Chinese would pay back over five years,
once ENI obtained the authorization of the Italian government. The
plant, destined for Fushun, was to serve the nearby Daqing refinery.
The contract was the kick-off point for a marked Chinese interest in
petrochemical plants, which rolled out over the next few years.
Mattei was not destined to see these outcomes. On 27 October
1962, he died in a plane accident. A successor was immediately found
in Professor Marcello Boldrini, one of the founders of the Christian
Democratic Party and Mattei’s political mentor. The chief decision
maker, however, was the vice-president, Eugenio Cefis, who would
eventually become ENI’s new president in 1967.
Regardless of the many negotiations that took place, the 1963
agreement remained the only contract signed between the Società
Nazionale Metanodotti and the Chinese until 1965. Can this slow-
down be ascribed to the change in ENI leadership after Mattei’s
death? The research shows that it was the Chinese who harboured
doubts and, in fact, the signing of the 1963 contract was preceded by
tensions. In November–December 1962, ENI hosted a large Chinese
technical delegation for three weeks. The arrival of the delegation was
delayed for almost a month, probably as a result of the international
tensions generated by the Cuban missile crisis, which the Chinese
did not take lightly. When ENI’s export manager, Armani, met the
Chinese commercial consul, Gao Shanglin, in Bern in mid-November
1962, he had to reassure Gao several times that ENI’s new president
was following Mattei’s line. Gao even threatened to send the Chinese
technical delegation back to China if they did not receive their visas
to visit Italy soon.
The delegation was led by Zhu Jianpai, a chief manager with the
China National Import–Export Corporation, and included officials
87 Liu, China’s Fertilizer Economy, p. 60.
88 ASE, ENI, Relazioni Esterne, b. 1. Ufficio Commerciale ENI, Relazione sui
principali contratti commerciali siglati con operatori esteri, 21–27maggio 1962.
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from the Corporation, technical personnel from the China National
Technical Import–ExportCorporation, andGaoShanglin himself, who
would take care of the commercial aspects of the mission.89 Its main
aim was to assess the technical level of ENI’s plants and subsequently
make a decision about purchasing several plants which had been the
subject of negotiations that had been taking place since ENI’s spring
visit toChina.During the talks, theChinese complained about technic-
alities and the slowness of negotiations. Moreover, they expressed sur-
prised that there were machines of foreign provenance in ENI plants,
which was surely an aspect that had come to their notice before.90
The mission did not bring any outcome. An explanation of this
failure is that already by late1962 theChinese had offers of technology
from various competitors, comprising a much larger group than the
year before. Was the technology so very different from that offered
by the Società Nazionale Metanodotti? It seems unlikely, as most of
the technology offered by European competitors was really very basic,
likely to have been available since before the Second World War and
in fact the same technology that ENI and other European companies
provided in the early 1960s to other developing countries.91
In November 1964, the China National Technical Import–Export
Corporation signed a contract for the purchase of a ‘state-of-the-art’
polypropylene polymerization and fibre plant worth US$7.3 million
from Vickers-Zimmer. Apart from a pilot plant in Frankfurt, only two
other similar plants existed in theworld—one in theUnited States and
the other in Argentina.92 However, the Società NazionaleMetanodotti
was also able to provide this technology. This corroborates the thesis
that the Chinese wanted a variety of providers.
The largest andmost thrilling project to be negotiated was no doubt
the sale of the two petrochemical plants. The parties agreed to carry
out the final negotiations in Beijing in late 1963. However, on his
return from Bern, where he had been getting visas for the delegates,
Tosoni, an ENI engineer, reported an ‘unusually cold’ attitude on the
part of the Chinese commercial office, which ‘advanced serious doubts
on the negotiations for the sale of the reforming and aromatics plants’.
Tosoni offered an explanation for such a change in attitude: ‘they
89 ASE, ENI, Relazioni Esterne, b. 1. Riunione preliminare con la delegazione
cinese, Berna, 2 novembre 1962, Relazione di Armani.
90 ENI Historical Archives, b. 1.
91 Information from personal contacts with former Società Nazionale Metanodotti
technical personnel.
92 Cf. Mitcham, China’s Economic Relations with the West, p. 147.
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expressed their deep concern on the petroleum agreement signed by
the groupwith the SovietUnion, fearing that itmight tie ENI toomuch
to the USSR and prevent it from doing more business with China’.93
This, despite the fact that ENI’s first agreement with Soviet Russia
was signed as early as 1960: if this had been a serious concern for
the Chinese, it would surely have come up earlier? It is possible that
the Chinese were really overreacting about ENI’s involvement with
the Soviet Union. After Chinese leaders from the moderate faction
attempted to reconcile with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
in 1962, there was an abrupt change of wind: Mao realized that in
order to get back to power, he could not repair the Split.94 The year
1963 marked the point of no return. This left the Italians with the
feeling that the Chinese were using this issue as a negotiation tactic.
China goes ‘shopping’ for plants in Europe
In the years 1963–1964 China increased its acquisition of Western
technology. A valid hypothesis is that already by late 1962 the
Chinese had a much greater array of technology on offer from various
competitors. Italy had proved to be not bold enough, but this was not
the case with France or Britain. By the early 1960s de Gaulle’s France
was becoming more and more ambitious and autonomous (from the
Americans) in its foreign policy, particularly regarding China.95 And
Britain had spent the 1950s re-establishing the global sterling trading
network which was crucial for its internal economy. Though Britain
could not afford to oppose American strategic economic measures,
it had expanded to non-Western markets willing to use the sterling
and to so-called ‘soft currency’ areas, including Soviet Russia. China
mostly used sterling in international trade and as a result it was
a very important market for the United Kingdom. Besides, China
maintained financial and trade links with the British colony of Hong
Kong, making the link even stronger.96
93 ASE, ENI, Estero, b. 123. Promemoria di Tosoni per l’ingegner Girotti.
94 Li, Mingjiang (2011). ‘Ideological Dilemma: Mao’s China and the Sino-Soviet
Split, 1962–1963’, Cold War History, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 387–419.
95 Cf. Martin, G. (2008). ‘Playing the China Card? Revisiting France’s Recognition
of Communist China, 1963–1964’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp.
52–80.
96 For a detailed analysis of China’s financial and trade relations with Britain, and
for the role of Hong Kong, see Peruzzi’s essay in this special issue.
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In the spring of 1963 Lu Xuzhang, vice-minister of foreign trade,
was invited to pay an extensive visit to Britain, at the expense of the
British government. During his three-week stay, he called on several
British firms and met important political figures.97 In the autumn,
Lu Xuzhang made a second tour, this time visiting France and the
Netherlands. The benefits to local industry were immediately visible:
in 1963 the China National Technical Import–Export Corporation
bought a plant of prilled urea from the Dutch company, Continental
Engineering Company, and a plant for synthetic ammonia from the
British company, Humphreys and Glasgow.98 In January 1964 the
French company, Speichimi (together with Melle) sold a plant for
the production of butanol, hexanol ed ethylene to the China National
Technical Import–Export Corporation. Speichimi had taken part in
the trade delegation organized by the Conseil National du Patronat
Français (the French Federation of Industrialists), which visitedChina
in September 1963, in the very delicate lead-up to de Gaulle’s official
recognition of the PRC.99
Although Italy was not granted a ministerial visit, 1963 was a good
year for Italian big business. The chemical giant, Montecatini, which
had been a protagonist in the Chinese chemical trade in the 1950s,
signed a contract for the sale of two fertilizer plants. In the same year,
the Società Nazionale Metanodotti sold their its plant to the China
National Technical Import–Export Corporation, while ANIC signed
an important barter agreement.100
In the wake of China’s favourable attitude, and of the momentous
French recognition of the PRC, the conditions were finally right
for Italy to accomplish a long overdue achievement. The Italian
government resumed talks with China over the exchange of economic
missions and, finally, in 1965 the Italian Institute of Foreign Trade
(Istituto per il Commercio Estero) led the first Italian economic
delegation toChina.Thus, the opening of the office of the ItalianTrade
Commission in Beijing was ratified.101 Until official recognition took
place in 1971, the Italian Institute of Foreign Trade was Italy’s highest
97 TNA, BT 241/646.
98 Cf. Mitcham, China’s Economic Relations with the West.
99 Cf. Badel, L. (2010). Diplomatie et grands contrats: l’Etat francais et le marchés extérieurs
au XXme siècle, Publications de la Sorbonne, Paris, pp. 314–315.
100 ASE, ENI, Estero, b. 40. Memorandum firmato da Ratti e Zhu Jianpai a Berna,
30 gennaio 1963.
101 See Meneguzzi Rostagni’s article in this special issue.
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official representation in China, with symmetrical representation in
the China Council office in Rome.
The critical issue of ENI’s relations with the Soviet Union is not
referred to again in the papers after the episode that took place
in the autumn of 1963 in Bern. It might have been a tactic by the
China National Technical Import–Export Corporation to spice up the
pre-negotiation phase, or it might have been a warning of Beijing’s
sensitivity on this issue, which contributed to cooling down ENI’s
high hopes. The episode revealed to the Italians a different China,
that is, one that was developing its own identity and was willing
to set its own rules. Detecting a marked change in the attitude of
the Chinese, in December 1964, ENI’s new management organized
a high-profile delegation with the precise aim of ‘launch[ing] again
ENI’s name in China’.102 The delegation visited Beijing and was
invited to two dinner parties organized by the president of the China
Council,NanHanchen, andby the vice-president, LeiRenmin. In those
meetings, ENI delegates met many high-ranking officials. However,
themost productivemeetingswere thosewith the director of theChina
National Technical Import–Export Corporation, Shang Fucheng, and
with its engineers and managers. From these meetings, the Società
Nazionale Metanodotti received a new list of plants that the Chinese
were interested in buying, including detailed requests for technology,
which the Chinese knew the Italian group had been providing in other
countries of the world (for example, a plant for the production of poly
iso butylene provided to the Zarcua refinery, Jordan).103
The new strategy produced positive outcomes. A delegation from
ENI visited China again in March 1965, together with the official
trade delegation led by the Italian Institute of Foreign Trade, during
which they visited the Shanghai Refinery.104 On the same trip,
while acknowledging that tough competition priced them out of
selling fertilizer plants and simple technology, the Società Nazionale
Metanodotti decided to take a step up in the business relationship
by offering the Chinese the ultimate technology in refinery and
petrochemicals. As a sign of renewed appreciation towards the Italian
state holding, the Chinese agreed to host a resident ENI observer in
102 ASE, ENI, Estero, b. 98. Relazione sulla missione ENI mission a Pechino, 19–26
dicembre 1964.
103 Ibid.
104 ASE, ENI, Estero, b. 98. Relazione sulla visita della delegazione ENI a Shanghai,
8–10marzo 1965.
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X16000275
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. KU Leuven Libraries, on 25 Oct 2017 at 15:23:15, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
168 VALERIA ZANIER
Beijing for a period of six months renewable (the Chinese asked that
this concession not be publicized as this could jeopardize relations with
other Italian companies).105 It is likely that ENI’s positive reception
by the Chinese was influenced by the official exchange of economic
offices signed with Italian Institute of Foreign Trade. However, once
more, ENI proved to be one step ahead of its own government as its
engineer, Giampietro Spinazzi, set up an unofficial office in a hotel
room in Beijing, which he managed directly until the end of the
1960s. Though informal, this solution enabled the Società Nazionale
Metanodotti to coordinate the delivery of machineries and plants in
Fushun and Daqing (northeastern China), which proved critical in
consolidating the presence of the ENI group in the early 1970s.
Conclusions
From the analysis offered in this article it is possible to draw three
main conclusions.
First, however difficult it is to analyse business relations within the
framework of the Cold War, the present case study offers consistent
evidence that, for a number of Western European companies,
ideological constraints were not enough to prevent them from doing
business with Mao’s China. In the period examined, ideological
concerns had to be an integral part of a company’s foreign strategy.
In the case of ENI, some of these constraints even worked to its
advantage. As a state holding, ENI was considered more reliable by
the Chinese Communists, could deploy transversal political contacts,
and was able to trade with very limited recourse to Communist
intermediaries. This facilitated ENI’s actions, which were the fruit of
a carefully planned strategy towards China. The strategy involved first
collecting information for the feasibility of their ultimate objective—
petroleum outsourcing and petrochemical industry—then introducing
themarket to ‘easier’ and already tested products (chemical fertilizers
commercialized by ANIC), eventually building an integrated action
incorporating the complete network of ENI subsidiaries, and
culminating in the Società Nazionale Metanodotti’s contract of 1963.
Under Mattei’s leadership, the group planted the seeds for solid
cooperation in petroleum processing, which still exists today.
105 Ibid.
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Second, albeit no consistent proof exists, it is likely that Mattei
discussed Italian recognition with the Chinese cadres, even though
this had no results. Evidently, it was not within Mattei’s gift to help
Italy solve the complex problemof diplomatic recognition. It also needs
be acknowledged that, with his outspoken attitude, Mattei was a cause
of friction among Italian MPs and made many enemies even within
his own party. Furthermore, both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
the Ministry of Foreign Trade appeared to have been in competition
with Mattei as well as with his successors.
The third and final conclusion relates to the role of foreign trade
between the West and Mao’s China, and to the PRC’s alleged
inadequacy in doing business. The analysis of East-West cooperation in
the chemical and petrochemical industries unveils amuchmoremulti-
faceted image of Chinese economic planning and party bureaucracy
at the time. The existence of rich information networks and trade
practices—much more dynamic than one would expect—shows the
extent to which China possessed a concrete, alternative path to ‘Soviet
style’ modernization, well before the Sino-Soviet split took place. In
particular, it is shown that during the 1950s until the mid-1960s
connections with Western Europe functioned as levers for a cautious
but determined reconfiguration of hierarchies in the Socialist world
that would attenuate Soviet control.
Archival materials show that, despite pressing economic and
political constraints, most of the time Chinese officials were aware
of prices and commercial strategies, as well as of the up-to-date trends
in the industry of the time. Commercial consul, Gao Shanglin, handled
negotiations very effectively, by no means interfering or causing
delays with pointless administrative requirements. By observing his
attitude, as well as that of other PRC officials in those years, one
might even question Kornai’s eminent opinion that there was an
embedded inadequacy in Socialist countries with regard to external
trade practices.
Such results contribute to an alternative depiction of the Mao years
as a missing link in the long process of reversing China’s negative
image as a country exploited by imperialist powers, going back to
the unequal treaties of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Starting from early 1970s, there was a rising trend towards resuming
foreign trade andmany of the business actors—big companies in heavy
industry, chemicals, energy, and transportation—would lead the way
in the early years of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, showing that we can
detect a continuity between pre- and post-1978 economic reforms.
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